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Case #2: Gilles Villeneuve to join the 'Big Three'[/largefont]
Case Submission by RedFever
Court Decision by Richard Barnes
February, 2001
Preface
On the 8th of May 1982 Canadian Gilles Villeneuve, driving the famous number 27 Ferrari, died after a crash at the Zolder circuit, during the final moments of qualifying for the Belgian Grand Prix. Nearly two decades later, his memory and image still capture the imagination and admiration of fans everywhere, young and old. Both through his raw natural ability on track and his untimely death, Villeneuve was one of the most influential figures of modern Formula One. His death was universally mourned, and also left unanswered questions as to 'what might have been...'
The speculation about what Gilles Villeneuve may have achieved offers widely differing views, and has generated controversy and heated debate for almost twenty years. RedFever has brought the Gilles Villeneuve case to the Atlas F1 Court, to establish recognition of the man's greatness. For the purposes of this case, it was decided that Juan Manuel Fangio, Alain Prost and Ayrton Senna would comprise a triumvirate benchmark of great talents (the 'Big Three') against which Gilles' accomplished and speculated achievements could be measured.
Fangio, Prost and Senna all had the opportunity to turn their talent into accomplishment; Gilles Villeneuve's death robbed him of that opportunity. Prost and Senna raced during the same era as Villeneuve, allowing comparisons between their accomplishments under the same basic technical and technological racing conditions. Literature and other research material on the Big Three are widely available.
Finally, the 'Big Three' are almost universally accepted as legitimate greats. As such, the triumvirate provided an accessible and comparable benchmark. Doubtless, there are many others who deserve to be included among motor racing's greats - Nuvolari, Ascari, Clark, and a host of others. Their exclusion in this case is neither a snub nor an implication that Gilles Villeneuve was a greater talent. It was necessary purely to keep arguments focused, and comparisons at manageable proportions.
The case is not about whether Gilles Villeneuve was the
only driver who bears comparison to the 'Big Three', nor about whether he is the
most deserving driver to bear comparison. It is purely about whether Gilles Villeneuve, had he enjoyed a full career until retirement, would have been able to turn talent into accomplishment in the same way that Fangio, Prost and Senna did.
The Judgement
In a case like this, it is very easy to become lost in a quagmire of statistical information, quotes and personalised perceptions about what constitutes 'talent'. When faced with such a potentially complex mixture of fact, myth and personal opinion, the best solution is to pare the issue down to the basics, and keep those basics constantly in mind when reviewing and sorting evidence.
For me, the essence of this case is simple: If Gilles Villeneuve had lived and raced until retirement, would he have become a great achiever, rather than merely a
potentially great achiever? To answer that, we have to isolate the component parts of what makes an 'achiever', and decide whether Gilles Villeneuve was likely to have met those requirements.
In the field of motor racing, 'achievement' has three component parts - talent, approach and opportunity. An absence of any of the three aspects is certain to reduce the driver's achievements considerably. My judgement is based on the evidence brought before the Court, and I have rationalised it as follows:
- Talent: hand/eye co-ordination, physical strength, good reflexes and eyesight, exceptional spatial awareness - these are all natural gifts that the great drivers exhibit in abundance.
There seems no doubt, not even from the Defence, that Gilles had natural talent by the bucket load. Even his rivals were happy to acknowledge that Gilles had a special inherent talent for racing that few could match. To make the massive jump from Formula Atlantic to Formula One, and that after so few Formula Atlantic races, speaks volumes about the man's raw talent.
Gilles Villeneuve's death didn't change that; Gilles would have retained that talent birthright for as long as he raced.
- Opportunity: This is perhaps the easiest of the three aspects to quantify.
The traditional career path for a racing champion is to join F1 and cut their rookie teeth with an inferior team, before working their way up to the plum drive. Senna's and Hakkinen's careers are perfect examples.
When that natural order is inverted, it can lead to perverse statistics, and there is no better example than the case of Damon Hill. During the hearing, statistical evidence was offered to 'prove' that Damon was the greatest achiever of all, including Senna and Prost. The object of the exercise was to prove that statistics are worthless. However, the only point it proved is that superficial statistical analysis is worthless.
There is nothing fake or flawed about Damon's statistics - they are what they are, solid concrete fact. What the Hill case does serve to illustrate is the importance of opportunity. Hill benefited from a virtually unprecedented triple-edged opportunity. Firstly, he obtained the prime Williams drive very early in his career. Secondly, he inherited the team leadership (and a rookie team-mate) very shortly afterwards, due to Senna's untimely death. Thirdly, the above two events coincided with a 'talent vacuum' in F1, precipitated by the departure (for various reasons) of the previous generation's premier talents - Prost, Senna, Mansell, Piquet.
Gilles Villeneuve's career was also drastically affected by the three-pronged fork of opportunity. In contrast to Hill, though, all of the slings and arrows conspired against the Canadian.
Like Hill and like his own son Jacques, Gilles Villeneuve landed a great drive early in his career. The late-70's Ferrari wasn't anything like as good as the mid-nineties Williams, but it was certainly an upper-tier machine. Sadly for the whole Ferrari team (and Gilles in particular), the triumph of 1979 turned into the tragedy of 1980. Just at the time when Villeneuve was expected to mature into a world-beating driver, the car turned against him. And finally, just when mechanical fortunes had seemed to swing once again in Gilles' favour, he was struck down in his prime. The fatal accident at Zolder 1982 was a grim metaphor of Gilles' entire career - with all the talent and best intentions in the world, he invariably found himself in the wrong place at the wrong time.
However, we are not only concerned about the opportunities presented to Gilles Villeneuve during his life. We must also speculate on what may have happened had the fatal accident not occurred, and had he continued racing until retirement.
Prost had a 13-year career span. I don't find it unreasonable that Villeneuve would have raced for at least ten years, with retirement in the late 1980s or even as late as the early 90's.
From the time of Villeneuve's death until the turn of the decade, Formula One was dominated by three teams - McLaren, Williams and Ferrari. Villeneuve appeared to have a Ferrari seat for as long as he wanted, and McLaren appeared keen to sign him. Frank Williams may have had reservations about signing Villeneuve, but the Canadian certainly captured his attention.
Therefore, I think it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that Villeneuve would have enjoyed reasonably competitive machinery for the remainder of his career.
It's also fair to speculate that Villeneuve would have become the elder statesman of Formula One, enjoying an experience advantage over the upcoming quartet of Prost, Senna, Mansell and Piquet. Whether he would have been in the dominant car at the right time is of course open to further speculation. I believe that the answer lies in the third, and most tricky, component - approach.
- Approach: Approach is a combination of many factors - work ethic, will to win, nerve, political astuteness, confidence, and an understanding of how the various components of the car work together and against the friction offered by air and tarmac. Some of these are natural traits, others are learnt, but they are all in a state of constant flux.
A single accident can rob a driver of his nerve, or a single bad season can discourage him to the point of giving up. On the other hand, a first victory can shatter a mental barrier, and provide newfound zest and confidence. These are the intangibles of Formula One, and indeed any sport. The evidence provided by both sides regarding these intangibles occupied the bulk of my time spent considering the case, for I consider Villeneuve's mental state to be key in this issue.
Firstly, much anecdotal evidence was given to support the notion that Gilles Villeneuve was an all-round good guy, fair, honest, sporting, popular, loved by one and all. As touching as this evidence may be, and as much as it celebrates the memories of the man, it played no part in my final judgement, because it is irrelevant to the case. We are here to decide whether Gilles would have become a great achiever, not how he would have done so.
I examined the notion that 'the championship wasn't important to Gilles, he only wanted to win races'. This immediately reminded me of the annual Oscar Awards ritual, where nominees will state 'Winning isn't that important, being nominated is the real honour' as they enter the auditorium. One look at the faces of the nominees after the announcement tells you differently - winning is everything. Andre Agassi ritually belittled the status and reputation of Wimbledon - until he won it.
Even fierce competitors like Jacques Villeneuve and Ayrton Senna have been content to sacrifice race wins - once the championship was settled in their favour. Nigel Mansell, another of the 'championships don't matter, it's race wins that count' school of thought, failed to win another race in 1992 after he'd clinched the championship.
Gilles Villeneuve was intensely competitive; we can be sure that the championship was extremely important to him.
I believe that Villeneuve's apparent desire to push beyond the limits all the time was not because he only wanted race wins, and not championships. Instead, I believe it was the result of inexperienced enthusiasm, nothing more and nothing less. It's a common error, and not limited to Villeneuve alone. Prost and Lauda were both hard chargers during their early careers, only to adopt the Fangio 'win as slowly as possible' credo later on. Would Villeneuve have followed suit? I believe he would have.
Both human and animal studies have shown that ageing brings with it an ability to work smarter, to get the job done using less energy.
Villeneuve, for example, was enraged when Pironi broke a pre-race agreement at Imola. Thus, by the time of his death, Villeneuve's ultra-aggressive and reckless early style was already being tempered by the wisdom of experience. The rookie Villeneuve would have wanted to lap his teammate, irrespective of team orders. The Villeneuve of a few years later had seemingly adopted a more pragmatic approach to the business of racing.
There are also accusations that Villeneuve lacked mechanical sympathy. Again, this allegation is backed up by quotes largely from the Canadian's early years. And again, it's a common error among rookie drivers. It's uncertain whether experience changed that. Villeneuve had to flog the uncompetitive Ferrari during '80 and '81. All the mechanical sympathy in the world wasn't going to help teammate and WDC Jody Scheckter if he couldn't even get the car onto the starting grid.
One thing is certain - Gilles Villeneuve could never be accused of not understanding car setup. His wins in the turbo-lagged Ferrari prove the contrary - he had extraordinary ability to adapt to the peculiarities of the car at any given time, combined with an understanding to how turn in competitive lap times despite those quirks. His turbo wins have been accredited to some unconventional setups. It's irrelevant whether those setups would have benefited a more conventional driver - they worked for Gilles, that's all that was needed.
Gilles' apparent lack of fear in the cockpit is listed as another potential negative. I see it as the opposite. As he got older, he may have learnt fear. If he did, he would have probably become a better driver. If he didn't, he was daunting enough as it was. The only time fear becomes a negative is when the driver loses his nerve completely. In Villeneuve's case, that seemed an extremely remote possibility.
Politically, Villeneuve seemed too timid to assert himself in a team the way that Prost, Senna and Schumacher have. Of the intangibles, that is the weakest link. However, it's not an irretrievable one. No amount of internal politics can replace sheer raw talent. Teams didn't want Villeneuve because of the sponsorship deals he brought, or because he was a wily manipulator. They wanted him because he was so obviously talented. Again, though, there were signs of change: his anger at the Pironi affair, and his reported intentions of perhaps leaving the team, are signs that maybe a more assertive Villeneuve was emerging immediately prior to his death.
Final Verdict
Before I get to final judgement, a word about this Court's stance.
Unlike a criminal court, I did not follow a principle of 'innocent until proven guilty'. And that cut both ways. Neither Villeneuve's reputation, nor the Big Three's accomplishments, was viewed as the high ground. I started from a position of ambivalence. I did not ask the Prosecution to prove positively that Villeneuve would have achieved as much as the Big Three, nor did I ask the Defence to prove the contrary. For 'proof' in this case is impossible to provide either way. Instead, we are concerned more with compelling argument, and with reasonable speculation on what might have been...
In summary, it has been reasonably proven that Gilles Villeneuve had the raw intrinsic talent to become a Fangio-, Prost- or Senna-like achiever. Of the three teams who dominated F1 in the decade after Gilles' death, two were more than happy to have him drive for them, and the third had noticed his extraordinary talent. In addition, his main driving rivals during that time (Prost, Senna, Mansell, Piquet, possibly Rosberg) were mostly less experienced and arguably less talented than the Canadian.
I therefore find it reasonable that Villeneuve would have enjoyed some top-class competitive machinery for the bulk of the remainder of his career.
In terms of intangibles (approach), I find that the evidence against Villeneuve is based largely on the mistakes he made as a new and inexperienced driver in Formula One. I find enough evidence that Villeneuve, like so many drivers both before and after him, had learnt with experience and become a smarter and better driver with age, without losing the nerve, desire and commitment which characterised his earlier years.
I sincerely doubt that Gilles Villeneuve would have taken 66 pole positions, six World Championships and 52 GP wins. However, that was not the requirement. The Prosecution had only to argue that Villeneuve would have attained similar ballpark figures to those set by the Big Three. I believe they have done that successfully.
Therefore, In the case of Gilles Villeneuve and the Big Three, this Court finds for the Prosecution.