The idea that owning 0.95% of Aston Martin Lagonda gives Toto Wolff any say in what the Aston Martin F1 team does is risible. And of course Lawrence Stroll wants the race team and its place in F1 to be beneficial to the parent car maker. Why wouldn't he? And what has that got to do with Toto Wolff?
This is about a possible case of insider trading. It is nothing to with the governance of F1.
This is nothing to do with F1 or even the Aston Martin F1 team. But it is clear that the FCA is investigating whether Toto had privileged information when he bought his shares in Aston Martin. The FCA couldn't give a rat's ass about anything else and that isn't what this investigation is about.
Within F1, individuals have often owned shares in multiple teams - though even that is not what we're talking about here. Toto owns nothing of the Aston Martin F1 team and a tiny amount of shares in the car manufacturer.
Obviously you are free to disagree, BRG, but 'risible' is an hyperbole too far.
One may argue that Toto Wolff has no say in what Aston Martin the F1 team does, but he pretty clearly has a say in what the Mercedes F1 team does and of course Mercedes supply Aston Martin with their PUs. That in itself give him leverage.
Then one would consider how last year's Aston (neé Racing Point) was a highly suspect copy of the previous season's Mercedes, and the risk of conflict of interest and incest is self-evident.
Aston cut a deal to use Merc drive-trains in their road cars, Moers leaves AMG for Aston, Merc will be taking a 20% stake - this is hardly an arm's-length relationship, and Wolff is in the middle of the action.
Running a conflict of interest is not new territory for Wolff. You may recall that there was considerable overlap between when he joined Mercedes and when he sold his stake in Williams.
Just because Wolff owns only a minority of the road car company (published reports show it as 4.95%, not 0.95%) hardly means that he would have no influence. The last I knew the Stroll consortium owned only 22% of Aston Martin Lagonda, and yet we know that he and his pals call the shots and it would take an extraordinary series of events for the remote shareholders to depose them.
The late Walter Mondale once quipped, 'Nothing propinques like propinquity', and that applies here. Ultimately, shareholder votes and the fine print of contracts will (usually) prevail, but in the real day-to-day world it is networking, mutual back-scratching, and personal interest that make the running.