165 replies to this topic

[doc540]

While posting on another forum about the late champion, Jim Clark, I noticed a couple of comments from contributors who had strong opinions about the "notorious fraility" of some of Chapman's designs beginning with the Lotus 25(?).

I hope this is an acceptable question here among what I perceive to be an informed and experienced group.

I genuinely have no opinions or agenda, so I would appreciate your comments about this issue.
Is it an issue, and, if so, why?

Thank you
doc

[JtP]

I have never considered the 25 frail or the even the 24, but certainly some of Chapman's prior desgns did not contain a surfiet of material.

[RacingCrusaderUK]

Certainly for my own part, I have never considered Champman's designs negligent in any way. True they did push the boundry of racing car design and constrction and weight saving was a big part of that. Lotus however never used inferior materials, just less materials.

Also of all the cars of the era I would rather have had my serious accident in a Lotus 25 than anything else. It was actually a great deal stronger than any other of the single seat racers around at the time because of its new chassis design.

The bottom for me is really this. If a Lotus would let me win races, I'd probably accept the other, less palatable features of the car.

Than again, a lot of men met their ends in Chapman's machine. Actually somethign I've never known, have more men lost their lives racing a Lotus than any other manufacturer?

[RJH]

I don't feel that Colin Chapmans designs were inherently more dangerous than his contempories, we must not judge them by todays standards. Chapman was a racer who would always push the envelope in marked contrast to some of todays F1 Constructors who are happy to take the Ecclestone 'shilling' and run in the mid field.

[Henri Greuter]

Than again, a lot of men met their ends in Chapman's machine. Actually somethign I've never known, have more men lost their lives racing a Lotus than any other manufacturer?

=====

One would assume that, being in F1 for so much longer, most `killing`brand would be Ferrari.

But I know about the story back in long Beach '81, two journalists walking through the pitlane, one of them puytting his thumb on the nose of a Lotus, push gently but the bodywork inmediately showed where the man had put his thumb down....

His brilliance not withstanding, how succesful Lotus would have been if he had built his cars somewhat more rigid and solid than he eventually did? Think about Rindt who volunteerded to loose two kg's if the front axles of the 72 were strengthened for it in return.
Or Stewarts comments that he would feel less uncertain about a Lotus if it wasn't built by Chapman too but only designed by him.....

For me it is still something that makes me somewhat hesitant about praising Chapman: his cleverness, ingenuity and engineering skills are beyond doubt and makes hom one of the most brilliant designers in racing for me. He did however put his drivers under more risk in a period of time that was risky enough already.
But that's my opinion, feel free to disagree.

Henri Greuter

[m.tanney]

  When Lotus first arrived at Indy in 1963 there was much criticism of Chapman's "flimsy funnycars". Having read mostly British sources, I'd always assumed that it was just the carping of a bunch of reactionaries, in response to a threat to the established order. But in Dick Wallen's wonderful book Roar From the Sixties: American Championship Racing, Bob Schilling (a very good historian, IMO) writes that when the Lotus 29 first appeared, "The low-tech, light-duty brazed welds and mild-steel suspension arms were offensive to the roadster designers, who had learned respect for heliarc welding and chrome-moly tubing from their training in the aircraft industry, and they were shocked that the car even passed its safety inspection."
  I know that when Foyt got ahold of a Lotus 34 for the 1965 season, the first thing George Bignotti did was stiffen the chassis. He then replaced all of the Lotus made suspension components with pieces fabricated in his own shop. I believe that the other American Lotus buyers did the same.

  Mike

[lanciaman]

Legend has it that Chapman would build as lightly as possible until a bit broke, and then would beef it up.

[DOHC]

I think that there's at least one obvious case of incompetent engineering: the high rear wing on the 49 and 49B.

Both the struts and the wing itself broke, not once, but repeatedly, and both in F1 and in the Tasman series. Had the engineering been right, that wouldn't have happened. They would have cracked once, in the shop under testing, and that would have been it. The way the structure collapsed in racing was truly embarrassing. Whether this was Chapman's fault as an engineer or as a team leader is perhaps less important.

To my knowledge, there were no such structural collapses in Jim Hall's Chaparral cars. Jim Hall was also a highly innovative and well trained engineer, but his approach seems to have been different from Chapman's.

[holiday]

Ask Rindt ....

[Wolf]

Originally posted by holiday
Ask Rindt ....

I think most people agree that Rindt's tragic accident was a result of faulty machining of hollow front half-shafts, and not some inherent flaw in design...

[holiday]

Originally posted by Wolf


I think most people agree that Rindt's tragic accident was a result of faulty machining of hollow front half-shafts, and not some inherent flaw in design...

no. chapman always wanted the car as light as possible, that was his philosophy, and the front half-shafts were hollowed on purpose. rindt had already complaint about them and asked to replace the parts BEFORE the accident! Thats why chapman was directly responsible for jochen rindts death in probably a way as no other team boss was ever responsible for a drivers death! the guy was a genius, but he was also a criminal with little regard for another ones life as long as he saw his technical dreams on track fulfilled. ruthless.

[DOHC]

Maybe Holiday's remark was about the wings. Rindt disliked them completely, and he had certainly had enough after his (and Hill's too) accident in Barcelona in '69.

[holiday]

Originally posted by DOHC
Maybe Holiday's remark was about the wings. Rindt disliked them completely, and he had certainly had enough after his (and Hill's too) accident in Barcelona in '69.

no, it was about these hollow front shaft. THEY were objected by Rindt before the accident took place and THEY were immediately removed afterwards. Chapman was directly responsible for Rindt death and if then the prosecution had been half as interested in the case like they are still in Sennas, then we have every reason to believe Chapman would have been legally convicted by a court. Chap was a criminal, dont let racing passion come in the way of a sober verdict.

[Peter Morley]

Chapman was directly responsible for Rindt death and if then the prosecution had been half as interested in the case like they are still in Sennas, then we have every reason to believe Chapman would have been legally convicted by a court. Chap was a criminal, dont let racing passion come in the way of a sober verdict.

Somehow I can't imagine Colin machined the brakeshafts himself, so saying he was directly involved is a bit strong.
He might have designed them (but probably not, I'm sure Michael Oliver will tell us, but it might have been Maurice Phillipe?), but he didn't make the shafts and all he can be accused of is not making sure they were made correctly.
The Chap might well have been a criminal but there are far more obvious examples of that.

Anyone who thinks the Senna trial should even have started is completely barking.
When you get in a race car you know it is dangerous, you also sign away any liability, if you aren't prepared to take the consequences you shouldn't even get in the car.
I see that DC, for example, has said he wouldn't race if there was any real danger, so why is he paid so much money? In the 60's drivers drove for pleasure/fun/thrills not financial gain and in far more danger.

Back to the original point - in the 60's lots of people died in race cars, some in Lotuses, some in Coopers etc etc.
Given that Lotus produced far more cars than anyone else it would not be surprising if more died in Lotuses.
But when you study Coopers, for example, there are a lot of reports of people dying in those, possibly nearly as many as in Lotuses and give that Cooper produced roughly a 10th of the number of cars of Lotus, you could say a Cooper was far more dangerous (certainly it had far more inherent weaknesses due to poor design).

What Chapman did was introduce proper structural analysis that allowed the car to be designed for the job in hand, rather than throw something together and hope it worked. A result of which is that some parts were considerably lighter than previous examples, and all of these ideas were picked up by other teams - just Lotus did it first (as with many ideas).

[ray b]

how about some facts and numbers of fatial F-1 crashes by maker vs races run
and how many were car part failure vs tyre failure vs drive error????

cooper made a whole lot of F-1, F-2, F-3, and esp F-500 cars plus sports cars so I donot think 10- to 1 vs lotus is true
in total racer counts for the years cooper was building cars, sure more road loti were built, but not racecars in the same years say 55 to 70 and maybe way more coopers in total!!!!!

[holiday]

Originally posted by Peter Morley
Somehow I can't imagine Colin machined the brakeshafts himself, so saying he was directly involved is a bit strong.

Is this so difficult to grasp? Chapman refused factually to change them when asked by Rindt. Rindt saw things coming, Chapman had his head stuck so deep in his own arse that he presumbly deliberately looked away. Ask Mario Andretti how Chapman used to react when the drivers wanted to talk technical terms to them. Heresy...

Originally posted by Peter Morley
He might have designed them (but probably not, I'm sure Michael Oliver will tell us, but it might have been Maurice Phillipe?), but he didn't make the shafts and all he can be accused of is not making sure they were made correctly.

Well, they were made correctly at least in Chapman's mind. They were hollowed on purpose to make the car lighter and this get-it-as-light-at-any-cost-philosophy has always been Chapmans credo.

Originally posted by Peter Morley
When you get in a race car you know it is dangerous, you also sign away any liability, if you aren't prepared to take the consequences you shouldn't even get in the car.

Conclusion:
Chapman was directly responsible for Jochen Rindts death because
a) he first hollowed the shafts which was an unresponsible act
b) he refused to make changes when required by Rindt to do so


He should be brought to court because I dont consider racing as a law-free area, not even in a Nostalgia Forum, I am afraid.

[DOHC]

I hadn't heard about Rindt's objection to the front shafts before, but I recall that when he died, the press immediately mentioned that it was caused by a technical failure. Because the car veered sharply to the left, it was suggested that the right front half shaft had broken. That theory was "true" at the time of the accident.

IIRC, the half shafts were supplied by GKN (you may recall that GKN had their logo on decals on the rear wing endplates of the Lotus 72, although the wing had been taken off at Monza). And I remember reading something similar to what Wolf mentions, that "a faulty part had been supplied." Between the lines, one could figure out that it was GKN who had failed. Of course, they could have supplied exactly what Lotus had designed, specified or constructed.

Much later when I have read about that accident, I have seen accounts of the type "unknown cause, probably a technical failure." Sometimes a broken half shaft is mentioned, at other times it seems to be unclear what caused the accident. There's usually never any mention of subcontactors, faulty parts, but just "accident." No fingers are pointed, not to Chapman, and in particular not to GKN.

While I agree that Chapman was ahead of his time and highly innovative too, I think that his "genius status" is overemphasized. For example, his introduction of modern monocoques (let's leave the old, unusual one-off stuff aside...) is often regarded as a stroke of genius. But while we're talking about a "sober verdict," everybody knew, also back in the 60s, that racing cars had more in common with airplanes than with road cars, and many of the F1/GP constructors and engineers also had a background in aviation technology. (Some, like Maurice Phillippe, had even worked in aviation.) And there the monocoque idea reigned supreme. In fact, from a serious engineering point of view, it was only natural to construct monocoque racing cars. I can only see one reason why it took until Lotus 25 to do it: racing car constructors were a bit conservative. In Ferrari's case it took a lot longer to introduce monocoques.

It seems, however, that there was a whole lot of trial and error, and very little computation in the construction work. Both the Lotus 49 and the 72 tubs had to be stiffened after initially having been too weak. And I think that Michael Oliver in his 49 book also mentiones that the front rocker arms on the 49 were too weak and almost broke on Clark's 49 in the 1967 German GP after taking too much of a beating at Flugplatz. They were eventually replaced, against Chapman's original intentions, by heavier gauge rockers. Rear suspension links broke on both Hill's (British GP) and Clark's (US GP) 49 cars in 1967.

The obvious lack of strength calculations, or tests, is what I find surprising. To me (as an engineer myself) I think that the extreme stresses, and the importance of a high strength to weight ratio in racing and aviation, calls for a serious approach. A car (or an airplane) that falls apart looks pathetic to the engineer's eye.

It is all the more surprising because in racing, you first have to finish to finish first. It's pointless to have a car that can't be expected to last the distance, because then you can't expect to finish at all. Say goodbye to victory and championships!

The true engineer, IMO, makes it damn sure -- if you excuse the language -- that the car lasts the distance, takes the loads, and performs well while doing it. Today's F1 cars are of course of a different breed, and the budgets are vastly greater, but in a nutshell, this is what made the F2002 such a good car. It's true engineering.

By contrast, one wonders what Team Lotus was doing with those tall wings. They broke and collapsed time and again, and it went on for months. That was incompetent engineering. Rindt was right in his famous open letter. The wings had to go.

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Peter Morley
What Chapman did was introduce proper structural analysis that allowed the car to be designed for the job in hand, rather than throw something together and hope it worked.

In case of the tall rear wing of the 49, this statement is clearly false. That structure was very simple to analyze, but they never managed to get it right. Instead they did keep throwing it together, making it bigger overnight, etc, in the hope that it might work. It didn't.

There are rumors that Chapman did structural analysis, but it is more likely that Maurice Phillippe, with his previous experience from de Havilland, did such work.

But one should also remember that if some work was done at the drawing board, a lot was done in the garage at the track. And there Chapman must have had the last word.

[Vrba]

Originally posted by holiday

....Chapman was directly responsible for Jochen Rindts death because
a) he first hollowed the shafts which was an unresponsible act
b) he refused to make changes when required by Rindt to do so
....

The problem wasn't that the shafts were hollowed. They were designed and calculated to have enough cross-section area to withstand the torque. However, the safety coefficient (term?) obviously was not much greater than 1, i.e. the shafts weren't able to withstand much greater load than supposed.
But the real problem arose when the shafts, that were drilled from both sides and the holes met in the middle, were imperfectly drilled. The bores didn't meet exactly (they weren't perfectly coaxial) and a slight edge formed in the middle of the shaft, raising stress considerably. Therefore, there's a strong possibility that at this cross section, the shaft wasn't strong enough.

Hrvoje

[RacingCrusaderUK]

Much as it pains me to do it, and this I admit is a controversial view and WILL get people's backs up (for that I apologise), I have always aportioned most of the balme for Rindt's death to Rindt himself. If he had been wearing his crutch straps, he wouldn't have submarined and had those grevious throat and lower leg injuries inflicted upon him. I do not doubt that something failed catastrophically on the Lotus, but the accident was, in my opinion very survivable.

I do not for a second beleive that Chapman would have deliberately risked the life of one of his own drivers (who it has to be said he was growing in respect towards) only two years after the death of his close friend Jimmy Clark.

[Wolf]

Vrba & all, I think the main problem with halfshaft in Jochen's car wasn't related to safety factors, but IIRC halfshaft wasnt bored 'clean through', and there was relatively abrupt change in inner diameter of the tube. Anyone familiar with stress analysis will remember that such things cause notch sensitivity which greatly reduces part's strength and is particularly detrimental to its resistance to fatigue (most critical criterion for structural parts). This particularly effects high quality steel (much more than e.g. light metals and alloys)... I think it was probably poor QC that was responsible for that accident.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC


In case of the tall rear wing of the 49, this statement is clearly false. That structure was very simple to analyze, but they never managed to get it right. Instead they did keep throwing it together, making it bigger overnight, etc, in the hope that it might work. It didn't.

Really?
I was told (by people who were there at the time) that it was very hard to calculate the stresses on these structures, since this was a completely new science (involving various dynamic forces) at the time no one had any idea of the level of loads that would be created.
Of course modern rolling road windtunnels, FEA, DFA etc. make these calculations much simpler, as does the existence of formulae for assessing dynamic loads which had never been applied (if they existed) to this kind of structure at the time.
The 2nd half of this paragraph almost re-inforces what I am saying, they had no idea how great the loads were (either aero, or dynamic) and no matter how much stronger they made the structure it was not strong enough.

When you look at the 49 wing (as I can do right now) it is hard to believe how much downforce it created but it did have the advantage of running in clear air, which is totally different to a current wing running close to the ground.

Well, they were made correctly at least in Chapman's mind. They were hollowed on purpose to make the car lighter and this get-it-as-light-at-any-cost-philosophy has always been Chapmans credo.

Don't forget that hollow shafts are stronger than solid ones - a small point that seems to have been lost on people here.
Solid shafts are cheaper, that is why they are used on production cars, but they are not stronger.
I remember having to do the proof of this as part of my engineering degree, but I can't remember it offhand (it is to do with the stress distribution/polar moment of area).

And as someone rightly pointed out the problem with the GKN supplied shafts was that they were bored from each end and the bores did not line up correctly. The resulting stress concentration led to their failure - nothing to do with their design.

Bla bla bla. When you get in the army you know it is dangerous, you also sign away any liability, if you aren't prepared to take the consequences you shouldn't even get in the army. But does that justify any **** up of your superior?! Never heard of such a carte blanche. So dont give us this nonchalent racer BULLSHIT, think as a responsible person.

The reason I wasn't going to reply to this forum was I knew this was exactly the kind of reply that would come out.

If you join the military, part of your job description is to kill people, likewise you can expect someone to try to kill you - I am always amazed how many people change their mind about their chosen career when war breaks out (of course if you the Yanks are on your side you should be worried).
In a battle you are all minions (except for the leaders who remain well back, out of harm's way) and you can always blame someone else for your demise, but it was your choice to be there - unless we are talking about conscription, which is irrelevant since no one ever forced anyone to race a car (and I certainly disagree with conscription to the military).

If you have a puncture in your road car would you track down the name of the person who laid up your tyre (more than likely to be a machine thse days, but say you were running a historic car on hand laid tyres) and blame them for trying to kill you.
I know an American racing driver did, and eventually his family received some compensation but most of the racing fraternity believe this was out of order.

It is obvious you want to believe that C.C. was directly responsible for Rindt's death, and aren't going to believe anything else no matter how reasoned the argument is (not that I will give you anything like a reasoned argument), even though the same authorities investigated the accident as Ayrton's, you won't believe that it was investigated thoroughly (and I have talked to the people who have the remains) and even they weren't sure what caused the accident (of course modern forensics would help).

Whatever - the thing that killed Rindt was the faulty Armco installation, it should not have been possible for the car to go under the barrier.
Of course I'm sure Chunky was responsible for that as well, since they were clearly saving weight.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by ray b
how about some facts and numbers of fatial F-1 crashes by maker vs races run
and how many were car part failure vs tyre failure vs drive error????

cooper made a whole lot of F-1, F-2, F-3, and esp F-500 cars plus sports cars so I donot think 10- to 1 vs lotus is true
in total racer counts for the years cooper was building cars, sure more road loti were built, but not racecars in the same years say 55 to 70 and maybe way more coopers in total!!!!!

My thinking went something like this (e.g. the figures I remember):

Lotus made:

13 x Lotus 19 sports
118 x Lotus 20 juniors
11 x Lotus 21 F1s
77 x Lotus 22 juniors
131 x Lotus 23 sports

Cooper made:

15 x Cooper Monaco marks 2, 3 & 4 sports
22 x mark 2 Junior
19 x mark 1 Formula 1
28 x mark 3 Junior
no equivalent small engine sports car

Those are pretty much equivalent cars (except the Monacos which are of 3 different types/years)

This was Cooper's most successful period - later on they went down to producing just 2 or3 F1 cars a year and prior to that, when Cooper produced something like a dozen Bobtail sports cars Lotus produced upto a couple of hundred 8,9,10 & 11s.

And that is without any of the Lotus 6s & 7s that were used in competition (maybe they balance out the 500s).

Agreed it might not be 10 x as many cars but you must be looking at 5 x as many Lotuses running in competition than Coopers, and Coopers must have been the 2nd largest producer at the time???

Also including 500s distorts the figures a bit (and most pre-date Lotus) - despite their looks they were relatively safe race cars, seemingly very few fatal accidents in 500s! Can't be because they were slow, because they weren't slow!! Possibly their light weight made them 'safer'.

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Peter Morley


Really?
I was told (by people who were there at the time) that it was very hard to calculate the stresses on these structures, since this was a completely new science (involving various dynamic forces) at the time no one had any idea of the level of loads that would be created.

I'm sure it was new to them. Apparently they had no idea of the stresses, but the aero loads were very well known in aviation industry. It was by no means a new science. Mind you, 1969 was the year when the 747 took off for the first time, and it still flies. Wings don't buckle and collapse on airplanes.

As for calculating strength: there was a single beam inside a straight wing, supported by two straight struts, so it was about as standard as it could ever get. Fatigue from vibration in the struts, mounted on the uprights, wouldn't be much harder to deal with.

But the fact remains, they didn't get it right during the year those wings were used. Instead they sought to increase downforce by increasing wing size, and IIRC they extended the wings on both Hill's and Rindt's car overnight in the paddock before next day's race in Barcelona, where both crashed with broken wings in Turn 1. The wings were sagging and had begun to buckle the laps before the crashes.

Doing such work overnight in the paddock is not good engineering. You need to recalculate the structure, most likely redesign the wing beam and make it stronger, and make new struts too. But that's not the way it was done.

[Wolf]

Halfshafts aside, the wing strut problems were IMO probably buckling related, and one would be ill advised to try and look at them as under tensile load from wing... Just by looking at photos I can easily assume the aerodynamic forces greatly exceeded critical buckling stress (probably even the domain of linear proportionality between stress and strain for buckling).

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC


I'm sure it was new to them. Apparently they had no idea of the stresses, but the aero loads were very well known in aviation industry. It was by no means a new science. Mind you, 1969 was the year when the 747 took off for the first time, and it still flies. Wings don't buckle and collapse on airplanes.

As for calculating strength: there was a single beam inside a straight wing, supported by two straight struts, so it was about as standard as it could ever get. Fatigue from vibration in the struts, mounted on the uprights, wouldn't be much harder to deal with.

But the fact remains, they didn't get it right during the year those wings were used. Instead they sought to increase downforce by increasing wing size, and IIRC they extended the wings on both Hill's and Rindt's car overnight in the paddock before next day's race in Barcelona, where both crashed with broken wings in Turn 1. The wings were sagging and had begun to buckle the laps before the crashes.

Doing such work overnight in the paddock is not good engineering. You need to recalculate the structure, most likely redesign the wing beam and make it stronger, and make new struts too. But that's not the way it was done.

My point was the situation is far more complicated than for an airplane wing, the load calculations for which were well known for many years before then.

You also have loading from the suspension, the direction of the loading changes, then you have a variable angle of attack caused by the car pitching etc. etc. (don't forget these cars have pretty soft suspension, the car's attitude changes considerably).

What I meant was that while it was easy to calculate the loads on an airplane wing, calculating those for a racing car were not fully understood at the time, due to the far greater number of variables.

My understanding was the wing strut failures were caused by side loadings that were far higher than anticipated (e.g. totally unpredicted by then current aero theory), compression loadings were easily calculated.

And let's not forget these people were calculating using slide rules, not calculators, or computers, each set of calculations took a considerable amount of time, which is a commodity that has always been in short supply to racing teams.

Sure redesigning your car in the paddock overnight is not good engineering, but that is a fundamental difference between a race car and an engineering project - you just delay an engineering project, with a race car you either race or go home (a quandry that every racer faces at sometime or other, the frequency of which is probably dictated by budget!).

Of course modern teams with all their test teams and equipment tend to have the problem sussed well before they reach the track, but even so there have been cases where teams have reinforced rear wings over race weekends (at least twice in the last year - and those are the ones that teams admitted publicly).

Which just goes to show that even now it is still virtually impossible to correctly analyse all the forces that act upon a rear wing.

[Kerb Bouncer]

Originally posted by DOHC
To my knowledge, there were no such structural collapses in Jim Hall's Chaparral cars. Jim Hall was also a highly innovative and well trained engineer, but his approach seems to have been different from Chapman's.

As much as I have always loved the white Chapparals, there were problems with the wings and struts during races. IIRC a wing fell off Phil Hill's car at least once, and getting the struts which held the wings fastened right was a problem as well.

I think Chapman's remark that the perfect race car would cross the finish line, then fall apart has always been held against him to indicate his attitude. I cannot imagine that he ever wanted to make a car where a sudden failure would kill a driver. Still, we have to remember that a number of contemporary drivers, including Moss and Stewart, were critical of Chapman.

There was still a lot of by guess and by golly in building cars. Even in the 70s when many drivers in many makes suffered leg and ankle injuries in what are now minor shunts, safety was not at the forefront.

I get a little apprehensive looking at olderpictures where the driver's head is practically the highpoint of the car, and their head and shoulders are visible. Yes, the newer designs make the drivers more anonymous, but wouldn't it be nice to have Jim Clark, Bruce McLaren, and Jochen Rindt at trackside now commenting on the old days?

[Roger Clark]

Originally posted by DOHC
I think that there's at least one obvious case of incompetent engineering: the high rear wing on the 49 and 49B.

Both the struts and the wing itself broke, not once, but repeatedly, and both in F1 and in the Tasman series.

This, or statements like it, have been made a number of times on this forum. Could you tell me the actual races? I know of the failures at Montjuich Park, and in practice at Kyalami, which I believe were caused by the struts rubbing on the tyres. I know of no failures in te Tasman series. I may be wrong, but this thread seems largely built around incidents with the wings and Rindt's fatal crash. It would be helpful to get our facts sorted out before giving opinions.

I do know of many other Grand Prix wing failures, but the issue appears to be whether Lotus was less safe than the others.

[Milan Fistonic]

Originally posted by Roger Clark


This, or statements like it, have been made a number of times on this forum. Could you tell me the actual races? I know of the failures at Montjuich Park, and in practice at Kyalami, which I believe were caused by the struts rubbing on the tyres. I know of no failures in te Tasman series. I may be wrong, but this thread seems largely built around incidents with the wings and Rindt's fatal crash. It would be helpful to get our facts sorted out before giving opinions.

I do know of many other Grand Prix wing failures, but the issue appears to be whether Lotus was less safe than the others.

From the 1969 Shell Book of New Zealand Motor Racing.

It is worth noting that although the early rounds in this year's Formula 1 series were marked by an epidemic of wing failures the only sufferer in the Tasman races was Hill whose wing became unstuck in the Australian Grand Prix at Lakeside.

[JtP]

Re Rindt's 72.

The drilling of the shafts was brought up at the time of the accident. Chapman's case was that the drilling of the shaft removed the stress raising centre and the now tubular shaft was actually less liable to fatigue. The shaft being able to twist, but not having a centre to start fatiguing. Chapman was certainly not the man who made the faulty shaft.

It was also claimed at the time that the shaft was damaged in such a way, that the shaft was broken in the crash and not the cause.

Many people, including Fittipaldi, claim the accident was caused by the removal of the wings and this caused the car to be unstable. The instability under braking causing loss of control and the subsequent accident.

Re Lotus 49 wings

The failure was attributed not to the aerodynamic loads from the downforce, afteall they had been used for quite a number of races. But the negative aerodynamic loads from passing over the brow of the hill, with the car going light as it flew over. This was a load that the wings had not been subjected to before.

[JtP]

Originally posted by m.tanney
  When Lotus first arrived at Indy in 1963 there was much criticism of Chapman's "flimsy funnycars". Having read mostly British sources, I'd always assumed that it was just the carping of a bunch of reactionaries, in response to a threat to the established order. But in Dick Wallen's wonderful book Roar From the Sixties: American Championship Racing, Bob Schilling (a very good historian, IMO) writes that when the Lotus 29 first appeared, "The low-tech, light-duty brazed welds and mild-steel suspension arms were offensive to the roadster designers, who had learned respect for heliarc welding and chrome-moly tubing from their training in the aircraft industry, and they were shocked that the car even passed its safety inspection."
  I know that when Foyt got ahold of a Lotus 34 for the 1965 season, the first thing George Bignotti did was stiffen the chassis. He then replaced all of the Lotus made suspension components with pieces fabricated in his own shop. I believe that the other American Lotus buyers did the same.

  Mike

When the Lotus 29 first appeared at Indy, the percieved wisdom was "wait till it hits the wall". Dan Gurney did, walked away and qualified the spare 29 later in the day.

What was wrong or even today is wrong with brazing? Possibly that the techniques are harder and the job slower than more sophisticated modern techniques. In 63 such fancy welding machines were not that common. When did a Lotus ever suffer suspension failure because the parts were brazed rather than heliarc welded. One 25 did suffer total suspension failure, but that was down to Chapman not allowing for hydrogen embrittlement of the parts when he had them chromed. The 64 Indy suspension failure was caused by the tyre thowing a tread, not because of fabrication methods. Many Lotus employees came from the aircraft industry, esp DeHavallind.

Much criticism of Lotus strength came from the small rose joints used. This was deliberate and the joint was designed to fail before the chassis in an accident so the chassis suspension points were not ripped out. The concept was not Chapman's, but that of Dave Kelsey and John Teychenne of Progress Chassis company from their experience of repairing early Lotus club racing cars.

Foyt's Lotus 34 was a "Motor Panels Soft Aluminium Special" These cars chassis were not made by Lotus, but subcontracted out to Motor Panels of Coventry who made them out of the wrong type of aluminium. Bignotti and Foyt would probably have remade half the bits anyway on the "not invented here syndrom". Foyt probably still does the same today on racing cars he buys.

Chapman certainly built light and was obsessive about weight, ruining the original Lotus &( gearbox in the process. This probably came about from his days in 750 racing where the breakages appeared before failure in the short races involved. Strangely enough, Lotus were about the last F1 team to go to titanium bolts and similar hardware

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Roger Clark
This, or statements like it, have been made a number of times on this forum. Could you tell me the actual races? I know of the failures at Montjuich Park, and in practice at Kyalami, which I believe were caused by the struts rubbing on the tyres. I know of no failures in te Tasman series. I may be wrong, but this thread seems largely built around incidents with the wings and Rindt's fatal crash. It would be helpful to get our facts sorted out before giving opinions.

I do know of many other Grand Prix wing failures, but the issue appears to be whether Lotus was less safe than the others.

A list of wing failures, remedies and related incidents:

Oliver, 1968 French GP, practice - heavy crash. It is generally assumed that the car went out of control because of a wing failure (Rindt mentions this in his open letter). This was the first time out with a winged 49B. Hill's car had already been equipped with a wing and tested, positive tests led Lotus to put a bigger wing on Oliver's car which was shipped to France without having run at all.

Oliver, 1968 US GP, practice - heavy crash. The crash was caused by a wheel rim failure. The rims had to be replaced because of the much greater loads transmitted from wing to road, but Oliver's car didn't have the new wheels, IIRC. This was not a wing failure, but a failure caused by loads from the rear wing. In the race, Andretti's nose cone splits from the aero load on the front wings, which by now have grown much longer.

Hill, 1969 Lakeside, Australia, (Tasman Cup), practice. Wing struts buckled and bent backwards.

Hill, 1969 Lakeside, race. Wing struts collapsed sideways.

Rindt, 1969 Levin, NZ (Tasman Cup), race - heavy crash. Whether this was wing related or not seems unclear. Rindt ended up upside down soaked in petrol. About the crash, it was written that "something" caused the car to leave the track -- pretty much the same as Oliver's description of the French shunt the year before. Later it was suggested by the team that it might have been caused by a brake failure, but I don't recall Rindt mentioning this.

Rindt, 1969 South African GP, practice. Struts collapsed sideways.

Andretti, 1969 South African GP, practice. Struts collapsed sideways and car spun.

Rindt, 1969 Race of Champions, Brands Hatch. Struts collapsed sideways.

1969 International Trophy, Silverstone. Something has finally been done about the problem. Hill's car has braced struts: a brace looking like a thin radius arm runs from roll hoop to strut midpoint. Because of lack of time or parts, Rindt's car doesn't have braces, but its struts are shortened a la the Walker/Durlacher 49 driven by Siffert. A main difference though is that Rindt's car has a considerably bigger wing.

Hill, 1969 Spanish GP, race - heavy crash. Struts and wing collapsed. Hill was at first unaware of why he had crashed, but a mechanic explained and showed that the same was happening to Rindt's car. Hill wanted to stop Rindt, but they didn't manage to reach the pit before Rindt literally crashed into Hill's wreck.

Rindt, 1969 Spanish GP, race - heavy crash with head injuries. Wing buckled and collapsed.

Michael Oliver has an excellent account, also in pictures, of the final race meeting in Barcelona. The wings were changed and enlarged several times during the weekend. To increase span, extra tips were fitted. They were made of styrofoam cut to the actual wing cross section, around which a thin aluminum sheet was wrapped. There was no beam inside.

As the cars went faster (Rindt and Hill were 1-2), the wings were extended even more in the same fashion. Because there was no wing beam running the full span of the wing, the wing tips were sagging and drooping during and after practice. This is clearly visible in pictures, which also show how the struts bend under cornering loads.

To gain even more downforce, a large "flap" was added at the trailing edge, running the span of the original wing. Nothing was done to the struts. Wing tips were reworked and strengthened overnight so as not to sag during the race, which of course was much longer than the practice sessions.

In spite of this, Hill's wing lasted only nine laps. With the stronger tips, bending loads on the central part of the wing grew. A few laps before Rindt's crash, you can also see how a crease develops in Rindt's wing, near the inside of the right strut. It's buckling, and it's clear that it's going to collapse.

Originally posted by JtP
The failure was attributed not to the aerodynamic loads from the downforce, afteall they had been used for quite a number of races. But the negative aerodynamic loads from passing over the brow of the hill, with the car going light as it flew over. This was a load that the wings had not been subjected to before.

I disagree with this: the reason why the wings might not have taken that load before was because the add-on wing tips increased the bending moment of the wing. The aero loads should never have been negative as the car would then lose grip completely at the rear. In Hill's car at least it seems that the wing failed by buckling into a "roof" shape thereby generating the negative aero load that more or less made the car take off. Rindt did take off and had quite a flight.

To summarize, the Lotus wing development was incompetent. In Barcelona, it had nothing to do with engineering. It was stupidity, in particular as the structure had already collapsed numerous times.

As for the buckling struts, I can't see any excuse. That really is one of Euler's four standard buckling cases (and Euler is 18th century). I'd say it's case #3, although I can't tell for sure from the rudimentary blueprints of the wing in Oliver's book. It depends on what moments the top attachments of the wing would admit. And the buckling of a straight beam (the wing itself) is as standard as strength calculations ever get. Whether you use a slide rule or computer doesn't matter. You can solve that problem by paper and pen, and also look it up in plenty of handbooks. They might very well have done that -- originally -- but all those add-ons in the Montjuïch paddock were cut, paste and respray.

Although it's not much of defense for Chapman, one could say that other teams were even more ignorant (and less bold, of course). Looking at the wings themselves, only Lotus and Ferrari had aerodynamically correct wing profiles (Lotus seems to have used a NACA profile). The rest had very amateurish designs; the "wings" were rather "deflectors." And that probably sums up the attitude towards engineering. Trial and error, and club-race-style garage tinkering was common.

[Mohican]

I remember a report of the 1973 French GP (won by Ronnie Peterson driving a Lotus 72), where the reporter went to great lengths to describe how the JPS mechanics would go over the monocoque with a special chemical designed to show up fractures in the tub and its (engine and suspension) mounting points...

It was specially pointed out that JPTL was the only team to do this; presumably they were the ones with experience of this happening.

Also remember the comments about the "frangible" suspension at the 1975 British GP after Ronnie was furious at "yet another" suspension failure. Most post-Rindt Lotus drivers were sensitive about suspension failures.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC
I disagree with this: the reason why the wings might not have taken that load before was because the add-on wing tips increased the bending moment of the wing. The aero loads should never have been negative as the car would then lose grip completely at the rear. In Hill's car at least it seems that the wing failed by buckling into a "roof" shape thereby generating the negative aero load that more or less made the car take off. Rindt did take off and had quite a flight.

To summarize, the Lotus wing development was incompetent. In Barcelona, it had nothing to do with engineering. It was stupidity, in particular as the structure had already collapsed numerous times.

As for the buckling struts, I can't see any excuse. That really is one of Euler's four standard buckling cases (and Euler is 18th century). I'd say it's case #3, although I can't tell for sure from the rudimentary blueprints of the wing in Oliver's book. It depends on what moments the top attachments of the wing would admit. And the buckling of a straight beam (the wing itself) is as standard as strength calculations ever get. Whether you use a slide rule or computer doesn't matter. You can solve that problem by paper and pen, and also look it up in plenty of handbooks. They might very well have done that -- originally -- but all those add-ons in the Montjuïch paddock were cut, paste and respray.

Although it's not much of defense for Chapman, one could say that other teams were even more ignorant (and less bold). Looking at the wings themselves, only Lotus and Ferrari had aerodynamically correct wing profiles (Lotus seems to have used a NACA profile). The rest had very amateurish designs; the "wings" were rather "deflectors." And that probably sums up the attitude towards engineering. Trial and error, and club-race-style garage tinkering was common.

The fact the rear wheels occasionally came off the ground might suggest the possibility that the aero loads were sometimes negative.

The whole point is the situation is far more complicated than those covered by theories like Euler's - even now teams still get it wrong.
Your assumption that they never underwent positive lift, is the same kind of mistake as made by the designers at the time, hence their structure was too weak since they did not factor in all the load elements (my recollection was that they had failed to estimate the side loading on the struts (it was not even evident there would be any) and they did not fail in compression and certainly not in tension, they collapsed (or simply moved too far) sideways).

Lotus were at the forefront of wing development, and as with most new technologies mistakes are made - Mr Euler did not get his formula right first time - tyre companies make mistakes all the time and no one goes round saying all XQYZ tyres are dangerous, etc..

No one said that the Ligier was dangerous because it's underwing panels were too flexible when they copied the Lotus 78 but had failed to realise the strengh of ground effect suction - a sure sign of incompetence when you can't even copy something correctly.

Wasn't the first Lotus wing a section of helicopter rotor blade, that they simply fitted as an experiment, the section would have been whatever was in use at the time on whirlybirds.

Given the heli blade is strong enough to lift a helicopter off the ground it was probably felt that the blade (aerofoil) itself was strong enough - of course adding the extra winglets will have added moments that it was not designed to handle.

In the end when you offer a real race driver something that will make him go quicker he will always try it, and when you are allowed to add as much wing as possible you will do so (look at modern cars with silly midwings etc), you can't blame Lotus for taking advantage of a freebie.

I remember a report of the 1973 French GP (won by Ronnie Peterson driving a Lotus 72), where the reporter went to great lengths to describe how the JPS mechanics would go over the monocoque with a special chemical designed to show up fractures in the tub and its (engine and suspension) mounting points...

That is normal procedure - the process is called crack detection and originated in the aircraft industry, all stressed components should be crack tested regularly.
70's GP cars that are raced now are required to crack test all the suspension components (wishbones, uprights, stub axles, shafts) & wheels every 2 years and must have a valid certificate before they are allowed to race.
There are various ways of doing, this the chemical one being relatively crude and simple - it is an easy diy operation, so could be done at a circuit. Nowadays they just replace everything and take the used items back to be tested back at the factory before using them again.

I'm not convinced it would work on a tub though.

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Peter Morley
Your assumption that they never underwent positive lift,

No, I don't make that assumption -- what I'm saying is that it's wrong to produce lift. If it did, the design was wrong. Simple as that.

Originally posted by Peter Morley
Wasn't the first Lotus wing a section of helicopter rotor blade, that they simply fitted as an experiment, the section would have been whatever was in use at the time on whirlybirds.

Given the heli blade is strong enough to lift a helicopter off the ground it was probably felt that the blade (aerofoil) itself was strong enough - of course adding the extra winglets will have added moments that it was not designed to handle.

That first helicopter blade was tried in the Tasman series 1968. But it was a very small piece, maybe one foot span and 5-8 inch chord. Nothing at all like the tall wings. And of a different construction too.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC


No, I don't make that assumption -- what I'm saying is that it's wrong to produce lift. If it did, the design was wrong. Simple as that.

That first helicopter blade was tried in the Tasman series 1968. But it was a very small piece, maybe one foot span and 5-8 inch chord. Nothing at all like the tall wings. And of a different construction too.

I think everyone is agreed they got it wrong at first.
But suggesting their basic engineering was incompetent is wrong, their analysis of the situation was wrong, but that was understandable given that no one had been down that path before.
Lotus weren't the only people to make that kind of mistake and they certainly weren't the last or most recent.

The heli blade was small, my 49 wing (1968 British GP) is 59 inches with a 12 inch chord.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC


No, I don't make that assumption -- what I'm saying is that it's wrong to produce lift. If it did, the design was wrong. Simple as that.

That first helicopter blade was tried in the Tasman series 1968. But it was a very small piece, maybe one foot span and 5-8 inch chord. Nothing at all like the tall wings. And of a different construction too.

I think everyone is agreed they got it wrong at first.
But suggesting their basic engineering was incompetent is wrong, their analysis of the situation was wrong, but that was understandable given that no one had been down that path before.
Lotus weren't the only people to make that kind of mistake and they certainly weren't the last or most recent.

The heli blade was small, my 49 wing (1968 British GP) is 59 inches with a 12 inch chord.

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Peter Morley
But suggesting their basic engineering was incompetent is wrong, their analysis of the situation was wrong, but that was understandable given that no one had been down that path before.

Well, this is what I disagree with. If you have a major stuctural collapse of any kind, the serious engineer does the following:

1) On the assumption that the construction was correct (and properly handled) : check if there was a manufacturing error, or an assembly error, or something similar. If yes, revise production and implement some new quality control and go on using the same construction.

2) If no, you have some construction problem. Then you go back to the drawing board, recalculate, reconstruct and rebuild.

In the Lotus tall wing case it's clear that #2 applied, but for a whole year the proper action was never taken. And in Barcelona, they just went on to make a bad construction worse. The cars lasted about a dozen laps each. 15-20 minutes of action before a structural collapse! They looked at lap times, not structural properties.

The same thing had happened about ten times. How many failures were needed? Their analysis of the situation wasn't wrong -- they had no technical analysis at all. That was incompetent.

That's how two cars crash in the same spot for the same reason, for the tenth time.

A lot of engineering mistakes are understandable, but not that one. What I could understand in relation to this is Oliver's wheel breaking at the Glen. It would be a typical, and understandable, engineering mistake to get the wing and struts right but overlooking the load transfer through the rims, which was a secondary effect. A good engineer wouldn't overlook it, but an average one might very well do it. But you really have to be incompetent to have your structure breaking time and again without reconstructing it.

[Peter Morley]

Originally posted by DOHC


The same thing had happened about ten times. How many failures were needed? Their analysis of the situation wasn't wrong -- they had no technical analysis at all. That was incompetent.

That's how two cars crash in the same spot for the same reason, for the tenth time.

But the wings had worked in other races (mine shows no sign of imminent failure despite doing the British GP), different circuits threw up different situations that is what they weren't prepared for.

'Engineering' a car in the paddock was common practice in those days for most teams, it is only now with their test teams, multi-post suspension rigs, computer analysis etc. that teams can start to subject the car to 'real' loads without asking a driver to test the latest modification (and they still get it wrong).
The fact Lotus tried bigger & bigger wings during a GP weekend might seem strange now, but in those days they didn't spend more time testing than racing, most new ideas were tried out at a race.

Lotus aren't the only race team to have made such mistakes, even road car manufacturers make similar mistakes - all the different suspensions tested by VWs customers during the 1st 6 months of Golf production, Audi TTs wayward rear end, Ford Focus lively rear end etc were all made by people who had all the analysis equipment going, and unlimited testing time.

The original question was are Lotus fundamentally more dangerous than other makes and we have been sidetracked to questioning how good were Lotus's engineering practices. One thing that has always been evident is that their practices were way ahead of many of their rivals (you'd have been thrown out of Cooper's garage for using a slide rule!).

[Roger Clark]

Originally posted by DOHC




Oliver, 1968 French GP, practice - heavy crash. It is generally assumed that the car went out of control because of a wing failure (Rindt mentions this in his open letter). This was the first time out with a winged 49B. Hill's car had already been equipped with a wing and tested, positive tests led Lotus to put a bigger wing on Oliver's car which was shipped to France without having run at all.

If you're referring to the letter published in Autosport May 23rd 1969, Rindt didn't mention wing failure. He referred to the loss of downforce experienced when running in turbulent air behind another competitor. He said that he had experienced a familiar effect on a number of occassions. He also said that this would lead to a reduction on close racing and in overtaking.

I posted the test of the letter on this thread

http://www.atlasf1.c...&threadid=26632

[275 GTB-4]

Originally posted by Peter Morley
Lotus aren't the only race team to have made such mistakes, even road car manufacturers make similar mistakes - all the different suspensions tested by VWs customers during the 1st 6 months of Golf production, Audi TTs wayward rear end, Ford Focus lively rear end etc were all made by people who had all the analysis equipment going, and unlimited testing time.

Very good point!! and how about the absolute embarrassment of Mercedes A series trials in Australia where they found they fell over too easily sparking a majot rethink of the design

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Roger Clark
If you're referring to the letter published in Autosport May 23rd 1969, Rindt didn't mention wing failure.

He certainly mentions wing failure, in three different paragraphs even. Here are the excerpts from Rindt's open letter:

First of all, it is very difficult to design a wing which is going to stand up to all of the stresses, because who knows how big the forces are. If you make the wing stronger, it is going to be heavier and therefore produce bigger forces on the construction; you make it lighter and it goes the opposite way. This is not my wisdom, it all comes from the most successful racing car designers. Nevertheless I am sure that after some time -- and a few more accidents because of wing failure -- this problem can be solved.

Let us have a look at the wing if something goes wrong with it. And they do go wrong quite often, but so far nobody has been severely hurt.

To explain the reason for my accident, I was happily driving round the fastest bend on the track when my wing broke - - -

And finally he says:

Altogether I have come to the conclusion that wings are very dangerous,and should therefore be banned.

What happened after the Barcelona accident was that Lotus came to Monaco and ran Thursday practice with the same wing construction as before.

Hill, however, took some precautions. Having seen Rindt's facial injuries directly at the crash site, he bought a full face helmet, which he used for the first time in Monaco.

[Roger Clark]

Originally posted by DOHC


He certainly mentions wing failure, in three different paragraphs even.

But not in the context of Oliver's accident at Rouen.

[DOHC]

Originally posted by Roger Clark


But not in the context of Oliver's accident at Rouen.

True. My memory is fading: I only remembered that Rindt mentioned Oliver's accident in the letter, and that he spoke of failures. Sorry.

Edit: In his open letter of May 1969, Rindt speculates that Jackie Oliver's 1968 Rouen crash was caused by turbulent air from the car (Attwood, BRM) in front of him. Tony Rudd, in It was fun!, also casually refers to turbulence. How likely an explanation this is could be discussed; if turbulence had been a problem, why would the "bi-plane" car in South Africa in 1969 have the front wing at exactly the same level as the rear wing?

However, according to Michael Oliver's book, Jackie Oliver after the Rouen accident mentioned turbulence, but suggests a wing failure:

[The struts] were probably under a fair amount of load because you are doing 190 mph there and I think the turbulent air at speed and the sudden change of direction wobbled the wing. I think one of the supports gave way and, as a consequence, it fell over backwards. As it fell it picked the rear wheels off the ground. All I know is that I lost control in that manner...

He later commented (still from Michael Oliver's book) :

[Colin] used to have cars fail all the time, that was part of his stock-in-trade. He used to push things right to the limit and, as a result, he had very competitive cars. Now we've got engineers that can analyse things, so we reduce the risk. But then, the analysis was done with the driver in the car to see whether it would break. When things went wrong, being the type of person he was, he would normally be suspicious of the driver and he'd also be suspicious that the mechancs might not have bolted it together properly. Then, if those possibilities could be eliminated, he would consider if it could have been a design failure.

As a side remark, the last two sentences are interesting, because Oliver says that Chapman followed standard engineering procedures, just the way I outlined them in an earlier post. In the tall wing case, however, it's clear that the conclusion of a design failure was never reached, in spite of the numerous structural collapses, as the only modification was the brace that was added to Hill's car for the 1969 International Trophy race.

[Lutz G]

Originally posted by Peter Morley


The original question was are Lotus fundamentally more dangerous than other makes and we have been sidetracked to questioning how good were Lotus's engineering practices. One thing that has always been evident is that their practices were way ahead of many of their rivals (you'd have been thrown out of Cooper's garage for using a slide rule!).

-snip-


Mr
Colin Chapman
Howard Johnson Motor Ledge
Indianapolis 9.5.1969

Dear Colin,

I just got back to Geneva and I am going to have a second opinion on the state of my head tomorrow . Personally I feel very weak an ill, I still have to lay down most of the day, After seeing the new Doktor and hearing his opinion we can make a final decesion on Monaco and Indy.

I got hold of this incdredibly picture which pretty much explains the accident, I didn't know it would fly that high, Robin Herd apparently saw the wing go, but could not see the accident, since it happened around the corner.

Now to the whole situation, Colin, I have been racing F1 for 5 years and I have made one mistake (I rammed Chris amon in Clemmont Ferrand) and I had one accident in Zandvoort due to gearselektion failure otherwise I managed to stay out of trouble, This situation changed rapidly since I joined your team , Levin, Eifelrace FII wishbones and now Barcelona.
Honestly your cars are so quick that we would still be competetive with e few extra pounds used to make the weakest parts stronger, on top of that I think you ought to soend some time chekcing what your diffrent employes are doing. I sure the wishbones on the F II car would have looked different. Please give my suggestions some thought, I can only drive a car in which I have some confidence, and I feel the point of no confindence is quite near.

Best regards


-snap-

Lutz

[Ralliart]

I think it's worth mentioning, re: Monza '70, that John Miles did not want to drive the Lotus without wings but Chapman told him , in effect, "It's my way or the highway." Miles practiced, came in, and, then, DEFINITELY did not want to further drive that car without wings. Rindt went out in the second practice (or qualifying) before Miles, had the accident, and, I believe, Miles, drove a Lotus with wings in the race, or retired early with a wingless Lotus. I don't have the Lotus 49 book in front of me to check but Miles did not like the wingless Lotus.

[Doug Nye]

Reading through this extensive thread I am as struck by the smug assurance of some of the opinions - and verdicts - expressed, as by the common-sense and 'feel' for the period in question shown by some others.

As a hands-on practical racer Peter Morley's views are most in line with what I recall of Colin, of the period, and of what I have learned from those who were his people at the time.

Nobody - and I mean nobody in racing - fully appreciated the enormity of the forces involved (nor critically the directions and locations in which they would be applied) when aerodynamic download met jounce loads from Formula 1 road racing car suspensions being smashed over steep kerbs, dropped from one or two feet high over abrupt brows, and all the while fighting vicious and savagely-applied G-loads acting alternately fore and aft under braking and acceleration, and laterally while cornering...or (worst case) any combination of the above.

Nobody then had anything like a worthwhile understanding of aerodynamic wind-tunnel testing with adequate (or any) moving-ground simulation.

Stir into the pot the motivation applied by fear that if another development stride was not taken, some rival team might take it first...and then study the contemporarfy racing calendar, the pressures of which stoked the fires under the cooking pots into which these motor racing missionaries were all so ready and willing to plunge themselves...

Stir into the pot too the fact that that Colin Chapman almost ALWAYS canvassed opinion on a critical new move or innovation from his closest engineering confidants and his lead drivers before it would be run (OK, having canvassed their opinion he would sometimes bludgeon them with argument aimed to change it, but he would never - so far as I know - actually ignore their feelings or fears in the manner sometimes portrayed).

He certainly told me once that while several of his great drivers had occasionally expressed concern about a competitive design after it had broken, none were ever sufficiently concerned to pass up the chance of driving it again...because it WAS competitive. The only one who ever jibbed emphatically was Rindt - he was certainly the only one who jibbed so publicly.

ACBC was a gifted and self-confident stress man, but he was also - above all - A Racer.

He was driven to maximise any and every advantage he could envisage, and it was his support staff - like Len Terry or later Maurice Phillippe - who tried to temper that maximisation with conservatism. Len certainly was the man who made the Lotus 25 family sufficiently reliable to achieve the immense success it did achieve.

When they got the balance right the results were awesomely dominant - when they sometimes got it wrong their drivers were still, by and large, happy to have had the opportunity to race in such awesomely competitive machinery.

As for Chapman having been responsible for Jochen Rindt's death - this is simple tabloid drivel.

He could have been - arguably - the man bearing principal, ultimate, buck-stops-here responsibility for the brake-shaft failure which almost certainly triggered the initial loss of control...simply due to his having sanctioned adoption of that kind of brake configuration, to that specific design.

In the location where the failure happened the car then impacted against what today would probably be considered a criminally badly installed barrier and floodlight stanchion.

In that Jochen opted to drive without the crotch straps of his harness secured, the Austrian was in minor part a contributory author of his own misfortune.

It makes vivid reading to apply a black-and-white opinion to a mixed-grey incident...but it's no more valid than recent political assurances that Iraq was a greater imminent threat to world peace than North Korea, rather than simply an easier nut to crack...

When Jochen had asked Jack Brabham if he would release him from his fresh agreement to drive for Brabham in 1969-70 because Chapman had just offered him more money than he could refuse to join Lotus, Jack said "Yeah - whatever you want, I'd rather you stay with us, but no way I can match that offer, and if you want to take it then consider yourself a free agent...but be careful...you know those Lotuses break quite often...".

Jack thought the world of Jochen.

He liked him immensely as a bloke and admired him hugely as a driver, and another Real Racer, and he kicks himself still for having let him go so easily: "I wish I'd tried harder to talk him out of that Lotus deal - if I had he might have won the title in 1970 in our BT33 and he might be with us still".

But Jochen made his own decision - for the money alone - and that lends weight to Colin's attitude - make the cars super competitive and the world's finest will fight to drive them.

And - demonstrably - they did.

DCN

[David Beard]

Doug...absolutely wonderful stuff as usual. Thanks. No wonder we all come here.

The Rindt / Brabham relationship, as you describe it, intrigues me...I had always imagined a more fraught affair. Champion in 1970 at the wheel of the BT33 sounds very plausible. But then what sort of race would Monaco have been that year?

[David M. Kane]

Three points, I too agree that Peter Morley is pretty spot on. Second, lets
remember that up until Lotus Rindt had driven Brabhams which tended to be
very strong cars that didn't have any of these sort of problems. Though I do remember seeing Sir Jack in a car with a very BEND wing that same year.
Thirdly, regardless of what happened at Monza there was NO WAY Rindt would have been in a Lotus the following year. He was in serious talks with Robin
Herd but he had serious doubts about anything build in Graham shed, personally I think his manager Bernie would have put him in a Brabham.

Granted everyone was going into unchartered waters on the engineering front. The point remains that Rindt asked for the 49 at Monza and he was told by Chapman that the only car available to him that weekend was a
72 take it or leave it. That is a direct quote from Nina Rindt.

I can't imagine driving for someone under those circumstances.

[Lutz G]

Here a few quotes from Jochen Rindt about Chapman and Lotus. I got these Interviews on video tape.

After Barcelona 69:

"These wings are just crazy - but Chapman can't get it into his head"

Q: "Do you lost yesterday your confidence in Lotus?"

Rindt: " I never had confidence in Lotus"

(...)

"I blame Colin Chapman for what happened cause he is responsible for any calculations. He should have known before that this wing will break. *After* the accident he checked everything and the calculations showed that the wings were not build strong enough"

In Silverstone trouble again with Rindt's rear wing and he went to the pits.
Stewart: I saw the wing of the Lotus came loose just in front of me! (Auto Motor u. Sport 1969)

Rindt: "Now Jackie Stewart is world champion - Lotus build the cars to be faster and faster but they forget that the car must be in one piece until the end of the race"

Yes he was afraid that something might happen. Rindt suggest to loose weight so Chapman could build some parts stronger. BTW: Mario Andretti said he asked Chapman the same in 1978 because he was concerned about the rear suspension (got this one also on video).

Back to Jochen:

Quote from 1969:

"The car is very very fast I just hope to persuade him (Chapman) to build the car a little bit stronger"

Summer 1970:

(from a long Interview with Nina and Jochen about his fears and accidents)

"my main concern is that something could break on my car"

Lutz