Originally posted by FrankB
...I have a couple of small points. Firstly the casualty figures of around 900 aircraft and 60 000 crew don't add up?
Oh good gracious I must have the jitters!. One too many noughts! 6,000!
Originally posted by FrankB
Although the effects of the attacks can be measured in terms of the damage done to industry, both directly and indirectly through labour having to be re-deployed, what cannot be readily measured is the propaganda value that the Allies gained. Do you think that the raids were planned possibly with this propaganda value as a greater priority than any miltary objective?
The British Cabinet discussed attacks on the Ruhr dams as early as 1938 so there was undoubtedly a strategic genesis of some sort to this type of mission. Most historians, however, tend to the view that propaganda was the greater motivator for the dams raid. Anthony Verrier in
The Bomber Offensive says:
"Even the attacks on the Moehne and Eder dams, rightly described as one of the greatest feats of precision flying, was more of a propaganda than a strategic success." Within Allied ranks, a great battle had been raging for some time over the question of "selective vs. area bombing". Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris of Bomber Command, having noted the very poor accuracy of bombing
per se, became the chief, and sometimes almost sole, supporter of area bombing which he saw as having both strategic and propaganda advantages. Ranged against this view was not only the US 8th Air Force, led by Gen. Eaker but many high ranking RAF and British political figures and it was from this political will that sprung the incentive to develop an airborne weapon with the ability to inflict devastating damage to selected targets. Harris was never convinced and was not a supporter of the dams raid, although he did not oppose it.
Churchill, whilst strongly supporting Harris's area bombing approach in the early years of the war on the basis that it at least took the fight to the enemy, was a source of encouragement for the British population and the people of Europe, and evidence of vigour for Capitol Hill to contemplate, came to the view by early 1943 that his chief of Bomber Command's way was not going to subdue the Germans or clear the skies of German aircraft and the ground of German field guns and tanks in time for the second front. German military production figures made that much obvious.
That Barnes Wallis was finally given official support, after facing bureaucratic indifference for a long time, suggests to me that the dams raid was seen as a test for the concept of highly strategic, knockout bombing. Harris contemptuously saw this as "panacea" bombing.
So I take the benign view; there was genuine strategic logic in the intention of the planners, no doubt with a weather eye to the potential for favourable propaganda. And when the raid was seen to achieve its initial military objective, at least in part, propaganda was milked for all it was worth and why not!
In the end, whatever well intentioned objectives were intended, the dams raid must go down in history primarily as a brilliant feat of technical ingenuity and human skill and bravery.
Verrier again:
"... the dams raid must be recorded as a tragic example of how idea and execution require the element of operational feasibility to form a strategic whole. What is so especially tragic about the raid was that it plays little part in the evolution of techniques for relatively accurate attacks on specially selected targets".