Posted 01 November 2003 - 15:48
[QUOTE]Originally posted by marion5drsn
When one considers that in 1934 that Cadillac was making a V-12 and a V-16 the theory of making a straight eight for La Salle wasn’t quite in keeping with the Depression theory. As one of the officials at Cadillac said later, “We must have been quite mad to be making these engines at that time.”
The above statement lends some credence to the belief that Cadillac was in fact very much in charge of who made what at G.M. at least in engines. The, “We make the V-8s at G.M. and all the rest have to make do with straight eights. After Pontiac made V-8s for 4 years why all of a sudden did they go to straight eights? The tooling was already made and in production mode, the workers were already trained to make all the parts for it. After all of that they decided to drop all of their advances and make an inferior design? If at this point it was cheaper to make straight eights remember they had to redo all of the tooling, retrain the workers, design a new engine, etc, etc. This does not make what I would call good decisions making. The casting of a straight eight block is probably not any easier than a V-8 block. Just look at a Buick block. The cyl. heads on a flathead V-8 are much simpler than on a straight eight O.H.V. Buick. It did take Ford several years to iron out all the problems in the casting of V-8 blocks but they did it by the millions.
Don’t you believe that Internal politics at G.M. had something to do with it?
M.L. Anderson
EDIT # 1
From the book , “CADILLAC, THE COMPLETE HISTORY.” By M.D. Hendry 1979, page # 239.
The design, however had become outmoded, particularly the three- piece block crankcase structure, with light alloy case and cast iron blocks. A unit block was better, in one material . This principal had first been applied way back in 1916 by the Ferro Foundry, Cleveland, in a line of V-8’s and V-12’sdesigned by ex-Cadillac engineer Alanson Brush. They were use in several makes, notably the Hollier, built by Lewis Spring and Axle Company in Chelsea, later Jackson, Michigan.
General Motors had already built such and engine for the V-8 Oakland and Olds Viking models during1929-1931. These actually preceded the Ford V-8; thousands were built and from a foundry point of view the casting were completely successful.
From the same page, “The La Salle for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936 was virtually a high class Oldsmobile straight eight.”
At this time, 1936, Cadillac was building five engines, the V-12,V-16, and two V-8s of 322 and 346 cubic inches. And the straight eight of the La Salle! Isn’t there something very fishy here somewhere? Cadillac wound up with so many engines and Olds and Pontiac couldn’t even have a V-8 apiece? Strange!
M.L. Anderson
Marion,
I just dug out my Hendry history of the Cadillac, and must agree, it does seem incongruous for Cadillac to have built so many different engines in those years. However, one must take a look at the times when those were being built. Of course, Cadillac had been building V8's since 1916. And of course, the LaSalle came along in 1928, as a "Junior" Cadillac. However, in the heady years just prior to the onset of the Great Depression, Cadillac, along with a number of other luxury car makers, determined that the coming generation of larger, heavier luxury cars would require engines of greater performance than they were building, not to mention a prestige factor. We see this in the introduction of the mighty Duesenberg Model J (1929), Packard's new V-12 (under development at the time of the stock market crash) replacing their aging "Twin-Six), the beginning of development of V-12 engines by Pierce Arrow, and the V-16 from Marmon.
Cadillac developed, almost concurrently with their 452cid V16, a V12 which used the same basic internals (pistons, valves, their cutting edge hydraulic lifters) as the V16, with of course a new block, heads, crank and manifolds, but all to essentially the same design. These Vee engines continued through 1936-37, likely (I haven't read that far) from castings and forgings that may already have been produced years earlier (Same with the Lycoming-built Duesenberg Model J, of which approximately 500 engines were built between late 1928 and 1932, but not all installed in cars until the end, in 1937, with the last Model J completed in 1940). These engines were not for "bread and butter" Cadillacs, however. These were installed in "super-luxury" cars, built to a completely different set of standards, with custom-built coachwork by Fleetwood (for the most part, although a few outside coachbuilders did install bodies on these chassis--documented in Hendry's fine book). In fact, even as all other US luxury car makers dropped away, leaving Cadillac and Packard (their last two small competitors, Pierce Arrow and Duesenberg were gone by 1938), Cadillac introduced yet another V16, the 120-degree (almost a boxer!) engine for 1938, simply because of a perceived need for a prestige product, but an engine far simpler and less expensive to produce).
Even into the depth of the Depression, the conventional wisdom was to design and produce even better engines and the cars to use them. After all, did not Ford pull out an awful lot of stops, go way out on a limb, to introduce an all-new V8 engine in 1932, historically the worst economic times the US ever faced? In fact, if one looks at the cars introduced by every US automaker in 1932, one simply does not find a single "bad car" in the lot. 1932 is considered by most automotive historians, and many, many enthusiasts, to have been an absolute "pinnacle year" in automotive design and engineering.
In retrospect, the idea that an even better car, a better engine, and superior design, even in a year of great despair was correct. Granted, the vast majority of automakers in business at the start of 1932 disappeared within the coming decade. However, it must be said that most all of them were small independents, and their like had been "shaking out" of the industry for the previous 20 years or so. However, the two large multicylinder engines with the greatest longevity of all were introduced that year, by small independent automakers. The Pierce-Arrow V12 went on to power Seagrave fire apparatus well into the 1960's, while the Auburn-Lycoming V12 was produced for/by American Lafrance (fire apparatus) until 1964-65 as well. But, the fact was, there were far too many companies trying to make it in the auto industry in an era of consolidation, mass production and its economies of scale, most simply would not have survived, even without a depression.
LaSalle, in its price class, was, in the 1930's, a car for those who wanted the prestige of a Cadillac product, but had not the money (or were unwilling to seemingly "flaunt" it in those days of breadlines). Hence the falling price of LaSalle cars at the time. In order to meet this market, the straight 8 was a wise choice from a purely business standpoint--less expensive to produce.
As for combustion chamber design, this was very much a "black art" in those years. Until Charles "Boss" Kettering and his small band of engineers had a few cylinder heads built with heavy glass portholes giving a view of exactly what happens in the combustion chamber of a gasoline engine, no one really understood the effect of different shapes and styles of combustion chambers on the output of an engine. Until that time, it was very much a matter of trial and error.
As for Ford's V8, it is very true that Ford experienced an extremely high rate of scrap in the foundry for weeks as they learned to make this very complex casting. It is also quite true that Ford replaced (actually very quietly) many early V8's in service in 1932. In fact, it is easily noted from reading about the 1932 Ford Model B (4-cylinder) and Model 18 (V8) cars that even the cars were not all that good as well (much to the dismay of hot rodders all over!), with it's unbelievably flexible chassis (Tony Thacker's " '32 Ford, The Deuce" -- Osprey, 1984) details much of this. However, by 1934, with the introduction of an "over-under" intake manifold, and the Stromberg 97mm 2bbl carburetor) the 221cid V8 reached much of its potential. What really hurt the Ford V8 wasn't the foundry problems at the outset, nor the lower power output (65hp) in it's first months, but rather old Henry Ford's intransigence regarding cooling, by relying on water pumps mounted in the cylinder heads, pulling water out of the head, rather than in the block, pushing water into the engine. This lead to steam pockets and overheating, particularly in an engine with nearly 4 inches of hot exhaust passage heating up the water jackets. Even with the introduction of a much more logical setup in 1937, Ford engines retained a tendency to run hot until the flathead was finally discontinued in 1953.
Yet, in all of this, it is my understanding that it really took the success of Cadillac and Ford (Cadillac at the high end, Ford at the low end, of the marketplace) to give the V8 (indeed all Vee-block engines!) acceptability in the marketplace, for until Cadillac surpassed Packard as the premiere builder of luxury cars, and until Ford firmly established that a mass-produced V8 was a viable engine design, the general public perception of this type of engine was one of exociticsm, interesting to look at, but not really accepted in the showroom. As for Buick, they like Packard, hung on to the straight 8 (Buick of course, with their tradition, along with Chevrolet, of having never built anything BUT OHV engines) well into the V8 era of the 1950's (both marques finally dropped their last straight eights at the end of the 1954 model year).
Lastly, I find it most interesting that GM, once they opted to go to the concept of "corporate engines" (By the way, Ford and Chrysler had "corporate engines" for nearly all their respective corporate lives until the 1990's), began their long slide from near-absolute dominance of the industry. Could there be at least some correlation? It does seem to me that GM's rise to pre-eminence in the auto industry came about by the expectation that each GM car was significantly different from its corporate cousins, each offering a serious choice to the buyer, each one having significant competitive advantages.
Art Anderson